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Abstract
This article considers the implications of the Award for freedom of navigation and the
use of force in the South China Sea, identifying the conclusions that can be drawn from
the Award and the questions that remain. The Award also indirectly raised the question
of the use of force to defend navigational rights. This article therefore revisits the Corfu
Channel Case for the light it may shed on the use of force and freedom of navigation in
the South China Sea. This leads to questions of the danger of miscalculation and the
potential importance of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (cues) in reducing
the potential for miscalculation to occur. This article argues that the de-escalatory approach of cues may be the way in which States can assert competing rights without
such action leading to loss of life.

i

Introduction

Warnings about unintended incidents in the South China Sea abound. There
have been near misses, and indeed loss of life, in incidents between government vessels and aircraft from China, the United States, the Philippines and
Vietnam. There was a collision between a us maritime patrol aircraft and a
Chinese fighter jet off Hainan Island in 2001, from which the Chinese pilot was
not recovered.1 There was also Chinese harassment of us Naval Service vessels

1 James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, International Maritime Security Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) at 290–291.
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Impeccable and Bowditch in 2009.2 Kraska and Perdrozo discuss a series of
confrontations between Chinese and Philippines vessels in 2011 and 2012 (including those discussed in this article),3 as well as Chinese harassment of Vietnamese vessels surveying for oil and gas in 2011.4 Zhiguo Gao and Bing Bing Jia
argue that China is protecting rights in its eez in relation to incidents involving the United States.5 Bateman also discusses a clash at sea between Vietnam
and China in 2014 over the placing of an oil rig by China in an area claimed by
Vietnam.6 Further, there have been military clashes for occupation of islands
between China and Vietnam in 1974 and 1988 with substantial loss of life.7 The
United States has given prominence to freedom of navigation operations in the
South China Sea,8 and there have been calls for Australia to do likewise.9 This
leads to questions of the danger of miscalculation. This was a matter clearly
in the minds of the leaders of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(asean) after the publication of the Award, as they made a joint statement

2
3
4
5

6

7
8
9

Ibid, at 287, 310–311.
Ibid, at 340–343.
Ibid, at 323, and generally, at 313–315.
‘The Nine Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status and Implications’ (2013) 107(1)
American Journal of International Law 98–124, at 119–120. On this point, see Jing Geng, ‘The
Legality of Foreign Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone under unclos’ (2012)
28(74) Merkourios: Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 22–30 and, for a contrasting view, Jonathan Odom, ‘A China in the Bull Shop? Comparing the Rhetoric of a Rising China with the Reality of the International Law of the Sea’ (2012) 17 Ocean and Coastal
Law Journal 201–251 and Jonathan Odom, ‘The True “Lies” of the Impeccable Incident: What
Really Happened, Who Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of
China) Should Be Concerned’, (2010) 18(3) Michigan State Journal of International Law, 16–22.
See generally, ‘Agora: The South China Sea’, (2013) 107(1) American Journal of International
Law 95–163 and Chris Rahman and Martin Tsamenyi, ‘A Strategic Perspective on Security
and Naval Issues in the South China Sea’, (2010) 41 Ocean Development and International Law
315–333.
Sam Bateman, ‘The Impact of the Arbitration Case on Regional Maritime Security’ in Shicun
Wu and Keyuan Zou, Arbitration Concerning the South China Sea: Philippines versus China
(Ashgate Publishing, 2016) 227–239, at 231.
see Kraska and Pedrozo, supra, n 1, at 313–314.
As to the us Freedom of Navigation programme generally, see Kraska and Pedrozo, supra, n 1,
at 201–214.
See Peter Jennings, ‘Might Doesn’t Make Right in the South China Sea’, Herald Sun, (Melbourne, 15 July 2016), reprinted in ‘Assessing the South China Sea Award’ Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, 108 Strategic Insights, August 2016, 10–11.

asia-pacific journal of ocean law and policy 2 (2017) 117-139

The Arbitral Award in the Matter of the South China Sea

119

soon after to affirm the importance of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at
Sea (cues) in reducing the potential for miscalculation to occur.10
This state of tension in the South China Sea begs the question of what the
implications of the Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of the South
China Sea between the Philippines and China11 (‘the Award’) are for freedom of
navigation and the use of force in the disputed area. Even though it did not
directly concern navigational rights, the Award addresses claims to maritime
jurisdiction around many of the features in the South China Sea. Its clarity on
the status of the various features in the South China Sea as rocks which may
have a territorial sea, or low tide elevations which may not,12 has direct consequences for the regimes of navigation in the vicinity of these features. The
Award was also critical of China’s actions in impeding vessels from the Philippines in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal, which
it addressed in some detail as discussed below. Further, the Award raised the
difficult question of navigation and overflight over disputed drying reefs in
the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone (eez), particularly in the vicinity
of the artificial island built by China at Mischief Reef.13 Questions therefore
immediately arise as to what China could lawfully have done to deny passage
to vessels navigating where they may have had no right to navigate, or for any
State to protect its vessels asserting navigation rights where vessels may have a
right to navigate; and also what can be done to limit the potential for this clash
of rights to escalate into something more serious.
This article will therefore look at the three particular navigational incidents
detailed in the Award and what it did and did not say about navigation, and the
use of force to assert or deny navigational rights. It revisits the Corfu Channel
Case14 for the light it may shed on the use of force and freedom of navigation
in the South China Sea. This article will argue that the conclusions that can be
drawn from the Award for freedom of navigation and the use of force are:

10

11

12
13
14

Joint Statement on the Application of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea in the South
China Sea, Heads of State/Government of asean Member States and the People’s Republic of China, Vientiane, Laos, 7 September 2016.
In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted
Under Annex vii to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea between the
Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic Of China, pca Case No 2013–19, 12 July
2016.
Award 119–261.
Award 399–417.
The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), International Court of Justice, 9 April 1949.
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High speed close quarters manoeuvering to deny navigation is excessive
because it is too dangerous;
Claimant states should not be aggravating the dispute by threatening the
use of force in disputed waters;
Artificial islands on low tide elevations generate no maritime zones and
therefore there can be no restriction on navigation in their vicinity;
Escort of vessels for their protection is not objectionable in itself, and
There are no Exclusive Economic Zones (eez) around the disputed features so there is no basis to interfere with navigation relying upon eez
rights as generated from those disputed features.
This leaves a number of questions with respect to the navigational incidents
in the Award:
What force can then be used to deny navigation?
What force can then be used to assert navigation?
Should states assert or deny navigational rights when there is a dispute
over the sovereignty of the feature in question?
What restrictions on navigation and overflight should there be in the vicinity of artificial islands?
Does the law provide a way to de-escalate dangerous assertions of contested rights?
This article will address the navigational incidents in turn in order to analyse
the conclusions that may be drawn from the Award on freedom of navigation
and the use of force. It will in doing so address the questions which remain
open as a result. It will then deal with separately with the issue of protecting
vessels. This article will argue that international law goes some way to addressing the questions raised by the Award but it does not ensure that miscalculation will not occur. This is a matter for restraint at the political and operational
level.
There is no scope within the limits of this article to explore fully important
related questions of the right of warships to conduct innocent passage.15 It will
assume for the purposes of argument that warships enjoy a right of innocent

15

D.P. O’Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power, (Naval Institute Press, 1975), at 138–145;
also, David Froman, ‘Uncharted Waters: Non-innocent Passage of Warships in the Territorial Sea’ (1984) 21 San Diego Law Review 625- 689, at 625–657.
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passage in the territorial sea,16 even though China requires prior authorisation
for this to occur.17
ii

The Use of Force to Prevent Passage – The Navigational Incidents in
the Award

The Award gave detailed consideration to incidents between China and the
Philippines in two different locations, Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas
Shoal.
In relation to both Scarborough Shoal incidents, the Tribunal concluded,
Based on the considerations outlined above, the Tribunal finds that China
has, by virtue of the conduct of Chinese law enforcement vessels in the
vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, created serious risk of collision and danger
to Philippine vessels and personnel. The Tribunal finds China to have violated Rules 2, 6, 7, 8, 15, and 16 of the colregs and, as a consequence, to
be in breach of Article 94 of the [Law of the Sea] Convention.18
This article will now consider these incidents in more detail to see how the
Tribunal reached that conclusion before moving to consider the implications
for freedom of navigation and the use of force.
1
The First Scarborough Shoal Incident
In the first incident at Scarborough Shoal, on April 28th 2012 two Philippines
Coast Guard (pcg) vessels, brp Pampanga and brp Edsa ii, were stationary in the vicinity of the Shoal for the purpose of handing over patrol duties.
16

17
18

See Ivan Shearer, ‘Navigation Issues in the Asia Pacific Region’ in James Crawford and
Donald Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea in the Asian Pacific Region (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 1995) 199–222, at 205–207. Note that aircraft do not enjoy a right of overflight
in the airspace over the territorial sea, see articles 2, 17, 19 & 87 of the Convention, and so
this article will not address overflight in any detail. The issue of military aircraft in national airspace without permission is not settled but customary requirements of proportionality must apply (Caroline principles: 2 John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International
Law (1906) 409–13). See Tom Ruys, ‘The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus
Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded from un Charter Article 2(4)?’ 108(2)
American Journal of International Law 159–210, at 185.
See Shearer, ibid, at 212, citing China’s Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone of 25
February 1992.
Award 435.
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The Award does not state whether they were in the territorial sea but the words
‘in the vicinity of’ suggests that they were.19 brp Pampanga reported that, at
0900, Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (flec) vessel flec 110
approached it at a speed of 20.3 knots to a distance of 600 yards before turning
away.20 brp Pampanga also reported that, at 0915, flec 110 then approached
brp Edsa ii at a speed of 20.6 knots to a distance of 200 yards before turning
away. The 2 metre high wake ‘battered’ two rubber boats which were transferring Philippines personnel.21
This incident raises three distinct issues:
Preventing passage that is not innocent;
Action against sovereign immune vessels, and
Balancing the protection of sovereignty against the risk of escalation.
2
The Second Scarborough Shoal Incident
The second Scarborough Shoal incident involved Chinese attempts to impede
the passage of a Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessel,
mcs 3008, in the territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal, as well as to prevent it
from entering the lagoon there. According to the Award, this incident occurred
on May 26th 2012 when mcs 3008 approached the feature in order to resupply
brp Corregidor, which was at anchor outside the lagoon.22 Chinese Marine
Service (cms) vessel cms 71 approached mcs 3008 approximately 7 nautical
miles from Scarborough Shoal.23 It then engaged in two high speed manoeuvres attempting to cross the bow of mcs 3008 at close range. Reportedly, only
dramatic evasive moves by mcs 3008 avoided collision.24 Chinese vessel flec
303 then attempted to do as cms 71 had done, again with mcs 3008 avoiding
collision only by hard manoeuvring.25 mcs 3008 managed to come alongside
brp Corregidor, after being pursued by flec 303 and cms 71, joined by cms 84.
At this time, cms 84 passed within 100 yards of mcs 3008 and took a stationary
position 500 yards away.26 A fourth Chinese vessel, flec 301, took a stationary
position 1000 yards away.27
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Award 418.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Award 418.
Award 419.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Award 420.
Ibid.

asia-pacific journal of ocean law and policy 2 (2017) 117-139

The Arbitral Award in the Matter of the South China Sea

123

After leaving brp Corregidor, mcs 3008 attempted to enter the lagoon. cms
84 then pursued and tried to cross the bow of mcs 3008. The other Chinese
vessels also pursued and manoeuvred to block the passage of mcs 3008. flec
306 and three Chinese fishing vessels then attempted to block the entrance
to the lagoon. Mooring lines from the fishing vessels caused mcs 3008 to stop
and go astern. As the vessel attempted then to pass astern of flec 306, flec
306 went full astern apparently in order to ram mcs 3008. According to the
report of the Philippines vessel, the two vessels came within 10 metres of each
other but the speed and manoeuvrability of the Philippines vessel averted collision. mcs 3008 entered the lagoon and came to anchor and the harassment
ceased.28
This incident raises the same issues as the first.
3
The Second Thomas Shoal Incidents
What if the feature is not a rock or an island? The Second Thomas Shoal incidents concerned Chinese attempts to deny resupply by the Philippines
to its marines aboard a naval landing craft, brp Sierra Madre, permanently
grounded on the Shoal.29 The Tribunal determined that this feature is a low
tide elevation therefore no questions arose as to navigational rights within territorial or internal waters.30 The Tribunal determined that it had no jurisdiction in respect of these incidents as they concerned a ‘quintessentially military
situation’.31 Even so, they further illustrate the level of tension in the South
China Sea and, more importantly, raise the issue of low tide elevations.
The Award described the incident in similar terms to the Scarborough Shoal
incidents, with Chinese vessels trying to impede the passage of the Philippines
vessels. In the first incident, on March 9th 2014, the Chinese vessels succeeded
in blocking a Philippine attempt from proceeding to the Shoal before later at
least giving warnings by means of sirens, megaphones and digital signboards
to prevent subsequent attempts. A machinery breakdown led to the two Philippines vessels departing the area.32 After a resupply of the marines by air, a
later incident on March 29th 2014 led to blocking and evasion manoeuvres at
28
29

30
31

32

Award 420–421.
Award 442. For a Chinese perspective on this incident, and others not directly discussed
in this article, see Hong, ‘Law Enforcement in a Disputed Maritime Zone: A Political and
Legal Analysis’ in Wu and Zou (eds), supra, n 6, 223–225.
Award 453.
Award 456, and was therefore excluded under art 298(1)(b) of the Convention as China
chose not to accept jurisdiction over disputes concerning military activities when it ratified the Convention.
Award 442–443.
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speed again.33 The Philippines Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessel used its shallower draft to evade the Chinese vessels and effect the resupply
and rotation of the marine garrison.34 On this occasion the Chinese vessels did
reportedly give warnings by means of whistle and some form of unspecified
communication in words, requiring the Philippines vessel to turn around.35
Two distinct and important issues arise from this incident – the lack of maritime zones generated from low tide elevations, and then the issue of navigating in the vicinity of low tide elevations which are occupied and disputed.
iii

Conclusions that Can be Drawn from the Award for Denying
Navigational Freedom and the Questions Which it Raises

1
Preventing Passage that is Not Innocent
Approaching the Philippines vessels at speed without prior warning appears
needlessly dangerous on the part of China. The clear conclusion that can be
drawn from the Award is that this is not an acceptable use of force to deny
navigation.
A number of questions arise from this. The first is, what if this had occurred
as part of an escalation of measures which began with a requirement for the
Philippines vessels to leave? Just as the Tribunal has not,36 this article takes no
position on the sovereignty of the disputed island or rock features in the South
China Sea. Assuming for the sake of argument however that China did have
sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, what could it have done to prevent what
would appear to have been non-innocent passage by the Philippines vessels?
The passage would not have been innocent on the basis that it was neither
continuous nor expeditious and the stopping was not incidental to navigation,
nor related to distress, in accordance with article 18 of the Law of the Sea Convention (‘the Convention’).37 To the contrary, it was for the purpose of patrolling
for law enforcement purposes, which is an act of sovereignty.
China could have required the Philippines vessels to leave the territorial sea
on the basis that their passage was not innocent.38 In a context other than the
33
34
35
36
37
38

Award 444–445.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Award 58–59.
(opened for signature 10 December 1982) 1833 unts 3 (entered into force 16 November
1994).
Convention art 30.
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South China Sea, this would be a reasonable action consistent with coastal
State sovereignty. Whilst provocative in the context of a disputed maritime
claim, it is still not unreasonable as it involved no threat or use of force. It
would merely be an assertion of sovereignty.
A second remaining question is, after giving a warning to the vessels to leave
for conducting passage which was not innocent, could flec 110 have taken
stronger action in response to a refusal to leave the territorial sea? If the warnings had been repeated and an opportunity had been given for compliance, it
would be reasonable for China to resort to a limited threat of force. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 1999 stated relevant principles in
the Saiga Case:
Although the Convention does not contain express provisions on the use
of force in the arrest of ships, international law, which is applicable by
virtue of article 293 of the Convention, requires that the use of force must
be avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must not
go beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Considerations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in
other areas of international law.
These principles have been followed over the years in law enforcement
operations at sea. The normal practice used to stop a ship at sea is first to
give an auditory or visual signal to stop, using internationally recognized
signals. Where this does not succeed, a variety of actions may be taken,
including the firing of shots across the bows of the ship. It is only after the
appropriate actions fail that the pursuing vessel may, as a last resort, use
force. Even then, appropriate warning must be issued to the ship and all
efforts should be made to ensure that life is not endangered.39
Although made in respect of law enforcement against non-sovereign immune
vessels, the principles derive from broader considerations of humanity and
international law generally.40 Even when defending sovereignty against sovereign immune vessels, actions should be reasonable and necessary. Actions
39
40

The ‘M/V Saiga’ (No.2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v Guinea), itlos No 2, Judgment 1 July 1999, at paras 155–156.
See discussion of the customary international law on the use of force in Cameron Moore,
‘Use of Force in Maritime Regulation and Enforcement’ in Robin Warner and Stuart Kaye
(eds), International Research Handbook on Maritime Regulation and Enforcement (Routledge, 2015) 27–40; and Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 271–282.
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which created a real risk of collision and potential loss of life, as with the actions of flec 110, therefore would not likely be justifiable. Shadowing a delinquent vessel out of the territorial sea might have been however. Therefore
flec 110 could have sailed close to the vessels in a safe manner and possible
even have fired warning shots. Risking life through collision however is not
justified in the case of a mere violation of sovereignty with no accompanying
threat to life.
A third remaining question is, given the claim of the Philippines to Scarborough Shoal it would also be reasonable for the pcg to have refused to leave,
what then? Article 279 of the Convention refers to the United Nations Charter, specifically the requirement to resolve disputes by peaceful means under
article 2(3) and the specific peaceful means identified under article 33, such
as negotiation, judicial settlement and so on.41 Further, and as noted by the
Tribunal,42 the 2002 Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea,
made by the foreign ministers of the asean States and China, declared a commitment to freedom of navigation and overflight in accordance with the Convention.43 It also stated an undertaking, in accordance with international law
and the Convention specifically:
to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means,
without resorting to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by sovereign states directly concerned,
and,
to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.44
41
42
43

44

Froman, supra, n 15, discusses this at 664–666.
Award 21.
Adopted by the Foreign Ministers of asean and the People’s Republic of China at the
8th asean Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia on 4 November 2002, available at www
.aseansec.org/13163.htm.
Note also endorsement of the Declaration by the United States, reported in ‘u.s. Statement Calls for Peaceful Resolution of Competing South China Sea Claims; China Protests’
in John Crock (ed) ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States’ in (2012) 106 (4) American
Journal of International Law, 855–856; see discussion of the Declaration in Clive Schofield,
‘What’s at Stake in the South China Sea? Geographical and Geopolitical Considerations’
in Robert Beckman, Ian Townsend-Gault, Clive Schofield, Tara Davenport, Leonard Bernard (eds), Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal Frameworks for the
Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources (Edward Elgar, 2013) 11–46, at 42; and in
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This would strongly suggest that neither State should resort to any threat or use
of force. The Chinese and Philippines vessels should therefore leave each other
alone.45 This also includes the other claimant States.46
While both China and the Philippines accused each other of violating these
principles in respect of various aspects of their overall dispute,47 the Tribunal
did not make such a finding and stated specifically in respect of the issue of
denying traditional fishing rights that ‘the Tribunal does not find the record
before it sufficient to support such a claim in respect of either Party’.48 The Tribunal did however state that, once dispute resolution proceedings have commenced, the obligations under article 279 of the Convention to resolve disputes
by peaceful means obliged parties not to aggravate or extend a dispute.49 This
is a further clear conclusion that can be drawn from the Award. Even when
proceedings have not commenced, the Tribunal referred to the Friendly Relations Declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 1970.50 It
stated that refraining from the threat or use of force is ‘inherent in the central
role of good faith in the international legal relations between States’.51 Even if
the Tribunal did not apply this point directly to the incidents in question, it
speaks strongly of the requirement to refrain from the threat or use of force in
such situations. It also echoes the dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez in the
Corfu Channel Case in 1949¸ discussed below, that, ‘To answer: vim vi repellere,
would amount to referring the solution of a purely juridical problem to the
arbitrament of force.’52
2
Sovereign Immune Vessels
A further question which arises from the navigational incidents in the Award
is, what use of force is permissible against a sovereign immune vessel?

45
46
47
48
49
50

51
52

Bateman, ‘The Impact of the Arbitration Case on Regional Maritime Security’, supra, n 7,
at 236–237.
Nong Hong states that both sides should avoid using force, supra, n 29, 215–226, at 223,
225–226.
The claimant States include China, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei,
Schofield, ibid, 28–33.
Award 448, 450.
Award 317.
Ibid.
un General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, un Doc. A/res/25/2625 (24 October 1970).
Award 459.
Corfu Channel Case 108.
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Importantly, it would not be permissible to board a sovereign immune vessel
in circumstances other than in armed conflict or self defence against an armed
attack. By definition, such vessels are immune from the law enforcement
processes of foreign States. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
stated in the ara Libertad case that, ‘in accordance with general international
law, a warship enjoys immunity, including in internal waters’.53 O’Connell had
earlier stated that:
…it cannot be doubted that the principles of international law relating to
sovereign immunity prohibit the arrest of both of these categories of ships
[warships and other governmental ships operated for non-commercial
purposes], in any circumstances short of declared war.54
Preventing non-innocent passage is not the same as apprehension for the purpose of law enforcement.55 The options open to the coastal State are different and have a different character. This perhaps reinforces the point that the
threshold for boarding, seizing or arresting sovereign immune vessels is very
high. In the absence of armed conflict or armed attacks in the South China
Sea, there should be no justification for such action against sovereign immune
vessels.
The principles in the Saiga Case would still permit firing at or into a vessel
where there is minimal risk to life however. flec 110, for example, could therefore possibly have gone so far as to fire at or into a sovereign immune vessel
from a non-claimant State to compel it to leave territorial waters. This could
only occur after an appropriate escalation, from conveying the requirement to
leave through to measures such as warning off, shadowing, warning shots and,
only if there was continued non-compliance, firing at or into the vessel whilst
ensuring that life was not endangered.56 A controlled action such as this would
actually appear to pose less risk to life than a collision of vessels at speed.
53

54
55
56

The “ara Libertad” (Argentina v Ghana) itlos Case No 20, Provisional Measures, 15 December 2012, at 21. James Kraska reiterates the importance of sovereign immunity in ‘International Decisions: “The ara Libertad” (Argentina v Ghana)’, (2013) 107 (2) American
Journal of International Law 404–410, at 409–410.
O’Connell, supra, n 15, 965; Ruys expresses a similar view, suggesting that it is a matter of
international peace and security rather than law enforcement, supra, n 16, at 186.
‘Self-defence and jurisdiction are not intrinsically related concepts’, O’Connell, ibid, at
964–965.
Froman, supra, n 15, considers a similar escalation of force to be appropriate in such situations, at 674.

asia-pacific journal of ocean law and policy 2 (2017) 117-139

The Arbitral Award in the Matter of the South China Sea

129

3
Low Tide Elevations
Apart from the Tribunal determining that the incidents had a military character, a key issue is the status of Second Thomas Shoal as a low tide elevation. A low tide elevation does not project any maritime zones and there are
no restrictive navigation regimes associated with it as far as the Convention is
concerned.57 Rather, high seas freedoms apply to the extent to which they may
be subject to rules applying within an eez. The Tribunal saw Second Thomas Shoal as falling within the area within which the Philippines is entitled to
claim an eez.58 There could be no disputed sovereignty, as with Scarborough
Shoal, as there was no rock or island feature over which sovereignty could be
disputed. A conclusion that can be drawn from the Award is there was no question therefore of preventing non-innocent passage or unauthorised entry into
internal waters. Claimant States still have an obligation to resolve their disputes peacefully. There could be no basis then for China to interfere with the
navigation of the Philippines vessel or any other State’s vessel, or aircraft, for
that matter.
4
A 500 Metre Safety Zone?
A question which arises from the Award however is what are the implications
for freedom of navigation and the use of force in the vicinity of low tide elevations? While Second Thomas Shoal has not been subject to artificial island
building at this stage, a number of other low tide elevations have. The Tribunal
identified Mischief Reef in particular as a low tide elevation which China has
built up,59 which does not fall with the territorial sea of another feature60 and,
more importantly, falls within the eez of the Philippines.61
Under article 60 of the Convention, it is the coastal State which may establish artificial islands in its eez, including a 500 metre safety zone around
them. Accepting the Tribunal’s view for the sake of argument, Mischief Reef is
now an artificial island but not one established by the coastal State within its
recognised eez. It would seem unlikely that the Philippines would legitimise
China’s claim to Mischief Reef by establishing a 500 metre safety zone around
57
58
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60
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Art 60 (8). See discussion in see Schofield, supra, n 44, at 22.
Award 256, 453.
Award 335, 355, 356, 365, 399–415.
Award 256, 456. The Award determined that Subi Reef falls within the territorial sea of
Thitu Island, 166, occupied by the Philippines. Hughes Reef falls within the territorial sea
of McKennan Reef (unoccupied) and Sin Cowe Island, 174, occupied by Vietnam. Gaven
Reef (South) lies within the territorial sea of Gaven Reef (North), occupied by China, and
Namyit Island, 174, occupied by Vietnam.
Award 256, 260.
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the artificial island, and China is not entitled to establish such a zone. Given
the 500 metre zone is for the purpose of safety around artificial islands however, it would seem prudent for vessels to avoid sailing within 500 metres of
Mischief Reef. Overflight of Mischief Reef should also be permissible but low
flying would appear to be unnecessarily provocative. This would not be a case
of accepting China’s claim so much as avoiding both unnecessary provocation
and unnecessary navigational risk. This would be consistent with the spirit of
the requirement in article 87 of the Convention for all States to exercise the
freedoms of the high seas with ‘due regard for the interests of other States in
their exercise of the freedom of the high seas’, even if China’s construction of
an artificial island on Mischief Reef would not itself be an exercise of a freedom of the high seas. This leads to the issue of navigation in the eez.
iv

Freedom of Navigation in the eez

The clear position in the Award is that none of the features in question generate an eez.62 There is also no particular meaning to the ‘Nine Dashed Line’63
in respect of navigation beyond the territorial sea of the disputed features. This
means that the conclusion can be drawn from the Award that there is no basis
to interfere with navigation beyond the territorial sea of the disputed features,
through relying on rights to an eez generated from those features. The Award
does address China’s violation of the Philippines eez rights, as generated from
uncontested Philippines’ islands, through preventing fishing and the conduct
of oil and gas exploration and exploitation.64 This concerned natural resource
rights rather than navigation however so it does not change this conclusion.
Even so, it was interference with eez rights in the award that raised the issue
of escorting vessels.
v

The Use of Force to Protect Vessels

The use of force to protect vessels is a distinct question which has attracted
attention due to discussion particularly of United States and Australian interests in freedom of navigation operations by warships and aircraft in the South
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Award 259–260.
Award 116–117.
Award 286.
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China Sea.65 To what extent can they use force to assert these freedoms? If so,
what then is the danger of escalation? The Tribunal did not address these questions but did touch on actions to protect fishing vessels. Its handling of these
issues provides some perspective for the issue of use of force and freedom of
navigation operations. This section will address the indirect reference to this
issue in the Award and then analyse it by reference to the Corfu Channel Case.
1
Protection of Vessels in the Award
The Award addresses Chinese escort and protection of its fishing vessels as
follows:
Chinese fishing vessels have in all reported instances been closely escorted by government cms vessels. The actions of these ships constitute
official acts of China and are all attributable to China as such. Indeed, the
accounts of officially organised fishing fleets from Hainan at Subi Reef
and the close coordination exhibited between fishing vessels and government ships at Scarborough Shoal support an inference that China’s
fishing vessels are not simply escorted and protected, but organised and
coordinated by the Government.66
The Tribunal’s concern was with China encouraging illegal fishing in the eez
of the Philippines contrary to article 58(3) of the Convention, which requires
States party to have due regard to the rights of coastal States in their eez.67 The
more important question this raises for the purpose of this article however is
the role of the escorting and protecting vessels. Putting the lawfulness of the
fishing to one side, to what extent can States escort their fishing vessels and
even use force to protect them? The point does not relate just to fishing vessels
as it could apply equally to oil exploration vessels, vessels resupplying the outposts on the various features or even merchant vessels passing through. The
question here concerns freedom of navigation therefore and not rights to fish.
Interestingly, the Tribunal did not question China’s right to escort and protect its vessels, only its action in doing so to enable fishing contrary to the rights
of the Philippines in its eez. A conclusion that can be drawn from the Award
then is that escort and protection of vessels is not objectionable in itself.
A critical question that this leaves open then is that, noting the discussion
above of refraining from the threat or use of force in international disputes,
65
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Supra, nn 8 and 9.
Award 296.
Award 297.
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what should occur when there is a dispute over whether passage in a particular
case is permissible or not? As will be discussed in more detail below, where the
passage is merely an assertion of a navigational right or freedom consistent
with the regime of the maritime zone in which it is occurring, even if it is disputed, this is not in itself a threat or use of force. China could quite properly
escort and protect its fishing or other vessels to prevent interference with their
passage. The escort itself need not be seen as a threat or use of force but merely
a measure to deter the threat or use of force by others. Should there be such
a threat or use of force then China would be able to use the minimum force
necessary to protect its vessels. The measures would be of the same nature as
those discussed above, including signalling, interposing escort vessels between
the threatening vessel and its target (which is not the same as threatening collision) and possibly even firing at or into vessels where life will not be endangered.68 Where the threat derives from sovereign immune vessels, such action
would not normally include boarding them for the reasons discussed above.
The Corfu Channel Case is close to being on point here and must form a part
of any analysis of the relationship between the exercise of navigational rights
and the use of force.
2
The Corfu Channel Case
Vessels from other States, whether claimants to South China Sea features or
not, should equally be able to exercise their navigational rights and freedoms,
including taking action to protect their vessels if subject to the threat or use
of force. This could extend to escorting and protecting vessels to deter such
threat or use of force. It is important however that the exercise of navigational
rights and freedoms clearly be just that, and not appear to be a threat or use
of force in themselves. Warships can still be ready and able to defend themselves. This is not a new issue. It arose in the Corfu Channel Case. Of the incidents between the United Kingdom and Albania in 1946 which led to the case,
O’Connell stated:
The important feature of the court’s judgment was that the right of passage of the two cruisers and the two destroyers was not affected by the
fact that they were at actions stations in view of an earlier attack from

68

As to proportionality in self defence at sea, see Kiari Neri, ‘The Use of Force by Military
Vessel Protection Detachments’, (2012) 51(1) The Military Law and Law of War Review,
73–95, at 86–87.
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shore batteries … the fact that the ships were closed up did not present
an ostensible threat to the coastal state.69
The statement of the facts of the case in the judgment is succinct:
On October 22nd, 1946, a squadron of British warships, the cruisers Mauritius and Leander and the destroyers Saumarez and Volage, left the port
of Corfu and proceeded northward through a channel previously swept
for mines in the North Corfu Strait. The cruiser Mauritius was leading,
followed by the destroyer Saumarez; at a certain distance thereafter came
the cruiser Leander followed by the destroyer Volage. Outside the Bay of
Saranda, Saumarez struck a mine and was heavily damaged. Volage was
ordered to give her assistance and to take her in tow. Whilst towing the
damaged ship, Volage struck a mine and was much damaged. Nevertheless, she succeeded in towing the other ship back to Corfu. Three weeks
later, on November 13th, the North Corfu Channel was swept by British
minesweepers and twenty-two moored mines were cut.70
With respect to the approach of engaging in innocent passage despite the
threat of the use of force from the coastal State to prevent it, the International
Court of Justice stated:
…the object of sending the warships through the Strait was not only to
carry out a passage for the purposes of navigation, but also to test Albania’s attitude… The legality of this measure cannot be disputed, provided
that it was carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of
international law. The “mission” was designed to affirm a right which had
been unjustly denied. The Government of the United Kingdom was not
bound to abstain from exercising its right of passage, which the Albanian
Government had illegally denied.71

69
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O’Connell, supra, n 15, at 104. O’Connell also discusses the case, with less analysis, in The
International Law of the Sea: Volume i (Clarendon Press, 1982) at 306–314. For a view sympathetic to the British assertion of the right of passage see Kraska and Pedrozo, supra, n 1,
at 219–222; also C.J. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea (David McKay Company,
6th ed, 1967) at 471–472.
Corfu Channel Case at 12.
Ibid, at 30, although the subsequent mine clearance operation was found to be a violation
of Albania’s sovereignty, at 36.

asia-pacific journal of ocean law and policy 2 (2017) 117-139

134

MOORE

The difficulty still remains in ascertaining whether passage is innocent. Even
if states have a right of innocent passage in the territorial sea of the features
of the South China Sea, these seas are not necessarily routes normally used for
international navigation such as the Strait of Saranda in the Corfu Channel.
This was an international strait and the Court expressly avoided commenting
on the territorial sea not within international straits. Schofield notes that the
disputed islands of the South China Sea are marked as ‘Dangerous Ground’ on
navigational charts and that much maritime traffic skirts to the west or east of
the area.72 The state in occupation of the feature may well perceive the presence of warships in the territorial sea as threatening if they have no obvious
navigational reason to be there. The lack of a navigational reason for the passage, together with a sensitive international political context, may well lead to
just the sort of miscalculation that saw loss of life in the Corfu Channel in 1946.
This could be the case whether the coastal state requires prior notification or
authorisation for the passage of warships or not. This is not to deny the right
of innocent passage of the warships, but it does point to how an unnecessary
passage might be perceived as non-innocent passage.
The difference between a task group of warships exercising innocent passage and an attacking fleet might appear to be very little. O’Connell stated that:
The task [group] was obliged to follow this channel at one point so that
the ships faced directly towards the Albanian port of Saranda, which
made their conduct appear unnecessarily threatening… The right would
not have lapsed for want of exercise, whereas there were risks in its assertion at a time of high political tension … The loss of ships and men
was a product of the Royal Navy’s incomprehension as much as of Balkan
brigandage.73
Ruys and Froman emphasise the importance of context in determining the legality of a forceful response to an incursion74 and, in 1995, Shearer stated of the
South China Sea, ‘For the time being, navigators are wise to give these disputed
territories a wide berth’.75 The law can only go so far in preventing escalation
where both sides believe they have a right to use force to defend their vessels,
aircraft or coastal State sovereignty.76
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Schofield, supra, n 44, at 40.
O’Connell, supra, n 15, 107–108.
Ruys, supra, n 16, at 175–176. Froman, supra, n 15, at 657.
Shearer, supra, n 16, at 212.
See Froman, supra, n 15, at 675. Kraska and Pedrozo, supra, n 1, at 247–252, discuss confrontations between Libya and the us over us freedom of navigation assertions during
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3
The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
To exercise the right to use force, even if minimal and non-lethal and against
a State vessel conducting non-innocent passage, creates the potential for dangerous miscalculation, escalation of force, loss of life and threats to international peace and security.77 The need to balance these considerations lends
itself to a case by case analysis rather than a clear simple position, but the risks
associated with miscalculation suggest erring on the side of caution. It would
have been helpful if the Arbitral Tribunal had elaborated on the use of force to
prevent non-innocent passage by sovereign immune vessels. It did not have to
do so to decide the questions before it so it is easy to see why the Tribunal did
not. Even so, the issue of the use of force against sovereign immune vessels in
disputed waters in the South China Sea remains very much alive and of concern. The second Scarborough Shoal incident amply illustrates this.
In the course of an incident arising at sea, there will be no court on hand
to determine which side has the better claim. It will be very much a matter
for the practical good sense of the mariners or aviators concerned as to the
steps to avoid dangerous escalation. This is the role of the Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea, which is not an international legal instrument but rather
a professional understanding developed by the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (wpns). The wpns is a meeting of the professional chiefs of the navies
of the region.
The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea states its own purpose and character in its opening paragraphs:
1.1.1 The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (wpns) “Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea” (cues) offers a means by which navies may develop
mutually rewarding international cooperation and transparency and
provide leadership and broad-based involvement in establishing international standards in relation to the use of the sea. The document is not
legally binding; rather, it’s a coordinated means of communication to
maximise safety at sea.
1.1.2 CUES offers safety measures and a means to limit mutual interference, to limit uncertainty, and to facilitate communication when naval
ships or naval aircraft encounter each other in an unplanned manner.
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the 1980s. The us destroyed a number of Libyan aircraft and vessels in different incidents,
arguing self defence. O’Connell discusses self defence of warships supra, n 15, at 70–82,
172–174. See also Dale Stephens, ‘Rules of Engagement and the Concept of Unit Self Defense’ (1998) 45 Naval Law Review 126–151.
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Units making programmed contact should use procedures agreed between their national command authorities.
Interestingly, the final version of cues was approved at Qingdao in China on
April 22nd 2014, around the time of the Second Thomas Shoal incidents described above. Notably, the heads of the member States of asean endorsed
cues on September 7th 2016, soon after the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal on
July 12th 2016. The Joint Statement on the Application of the Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea in the South China Sea affirmed that this was done as part
of a:
commitment to maintaining regional peace and stability, maximum
safety at sea, promoting good neighbourliness and reducing risks during
mutual unplanned encounters in air and at sea, and strengthening cooperation among navies.78
Importantly, cues only applies to navies. Given that coastguards are usually
not as well armed as navies, at least it applies where there is the greatest capacity for the use of lethal force. cues itself is relatively brief and provides for
manoeuvring and communication procedures. For the most part, the manoeuvring procedures reflect the Collision Regulations79 and the communication
procedures are relatively simple. However, the more substantive provision of
cues is clause 2.8.1, which states that the prudent commander should avoid:80
(a) Simulation of attacks by aiming guns, missiles, fire control radars, torpedo tubes or other weapons in the direction of vessels or aircraft
encountered.
(b) Except in cases of distress, the discharge of signal rockets, weapons or
other objects in the direction of vessels or aircraft encountered.
(c) Illumination of the navigation bridges or aircraft cockpits.
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Supra, n 10.
Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, concluded 20
October 1972, 1050 unts 1976 (entered into force 15 July 1977).
See discussion in Shearer, supra, n 16, at 213, and, on avoiding incidents at sea; W.S.G. Bateman, ‘Maritime Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Asian Pacific Region
and the Law of the Sea’ in Crawford and Rothwell, supra, n 16, 222–234, at 230–233. Geng,
supra, n 5, advocates that States should ‘create dialogues and form agreements to help
clarify the contours of military activity in the eez’, at 30.
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(d) The use of laser in such a manner as to cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment onboard vessels or aircraft encountered.
(e) Aerobatics and simulated attacks in the vicinity of ships encountered.
Such actions should go some way to avoiding the initiation of a response in
self defence. Problematically, there is an argument that it does not apply in
the territorial sea.81 Although cues does not state its geographical area of
application, clause 1.5.2 states that it ‘does not supersede international civil
aviation rules or rules applicable under international agreements or treaties
or international law’. Practically, it should make little difference whether it
strictly applies to the territorial sea or not. The actions to be avoided would be
provocative whether in the territorial sea or the eez. Given that cues has existed in some form since at least 2000,82 but received asean endorsement just
after the Arbitral Tribunal decision, it may be that implementation of cues
is the best hope at this stage of avoiding a dangerous escalation in the South
China Sea. It remains to be seen if it will be effective if a freedom of navigation
incident does arise.
vi

Conclusion

The Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of the South China Sea between
the Philippines and China assists in clarifying the geographical status, although
not the sovereignty, of many of the features in dispute. The Award is also clear
on excessive uses of force to deny navigation in the vicinity of the features. This
clarification allows the following conclusions, as stated in the introduction, to
be drawn from the Award in respect of freedom of navigation and the use of
force:
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Discussed in ‘Multilateral Naval Code of Conduct Aims to Prevent Unintended Conflict
in Contested Areas of East and South China Sea’ in Kristina Daugirdas and Julian Davis
Mortenson (eds), ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law’ (2014) 108(3) American Journal of International Law 529–532, at 531; also Ronald
O’Rourke, ‘Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (eez) Disputes Involving
China: Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Service Report, June 6th, 2014, at 9.
Chris Rahman, ‘Naval Cooperation and Coalition Building in Southeast Asia and the
Southwest Pacific: Status and Prospects’ (2001) Royal Australian Navy Sea Power Centre
and Centre for Maritime Policy Article No 7, at 31. Rahman also endorses the idea of greater
cooperation through cues, at 57 and 62.
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High speed close quarters manoeuvring to deny navigation is excessive
because it is too dangerous;
Claimant states should not be aggravating the dispute by threatening the
use of force in disputed waters;
Artificial islands on low tide elevations generate no maritime zones and
therefore there can be no restriction on navigation in their vicinity;
Escort of vessels for their protection is not objectionable in itself, and
There are no Exclusive Economic Zones (eez) around the disputed features so there is no basis to interfere with navigation relying upon eez
rights as generated from disputed features.
Its treatment of the navigational incidents at Scarborough Shoal and Second
Thomas Shoal raises further questions of the freedom of navigation and the
use of force. While it was not really for the Tribunal to address these questions, the history of incidents in the South China Sea and the potential risk
to life demand a careful consideration of the Award for its implications for
these issues.
With respect to preventing non-innocent passage in the territorial sea and
the Scarborough Shoal incidents, the Award is clear that risking high speed
collision is not lawful. It does not specifically mention the risk to life but the
implication is obvious. This suggests that lower level uses of force may be acceptable. Even firing at or into a vessel in a controlled way may be less dangerous than risking a high speed collision.
The Second Thomas Shoal incident raises similar questions about the risks
of high speed collision but the distinctive issue here is the status of the feature.
It generates no maritime zones and no question can arise of preventing noninnocent passage or unauthorised entry into internal waters. This has implications for the artificial island which China has built on Mischief Reef within
the Philippines eez. It also cannot generate any maritime zones, not even a
500 metre safety zone, but prudence would suggest avoiding sailing or flying
within 500 metres of the feature consistent with other artificial islands.
The reference in the Award to China using enforcement vessels to protect its
fishing fleet raised the question of enforcing freedom of navigation and the use
of force to protect such action generally. The Corfu Channel Case made clear
that enforcing navigational rights is not in itself a use of force, but it would
be permissible to use force to protect such action. Given the loss of life in the
incident that led to that case, balancing the enforcement of navigational rights
with the risk to life must be front of mind. The asean statement on cues not
long after the publication of the Award clearly suggests that it is front of mind
for many in the region.
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This article does not concern itself with whether a particular claim in the
South China Sea is valid or not, only the level of force which a State may use to
enforce its claim, whether as a coastal State or as a flag State. The mere presence of a foreign warship in the territorial sea does not of itself amount to an
armed attack and does not justify the use of lethal force. However, the potential
for misjudging whether enforcement of a right is actually an attack requiring a
forceful response in self defence is clearly high. Measures such as observance
of cues will hopefully go some way to reducing the risk of misjudgement, miscalculation or escalation.
The Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the Matter of the South China Sea between the Philippines and China, in so far as it is accepted, has clarified some
points but it also has raised further questions in respect of freedom of navigation and the use of force in the South China Sea. There is international law
which addresses some of the questions but it only goes so far. If further loss of
life is to be avoided, it will require restraint at an operational and political level
which the law can encourage but not ensure.
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